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CORPORATIONS
Milton M. Harrison*
In three suits, courts of appeal reiterated the well-established
principle that a corporation and its shareholder, or shareholders, are
separate legal entities. The first circuit in Mahfouz v. Ogden1 held
that the sole shareholder of a corporation may not sue in his own
name for damages suffered by the corporation and sustained the
granting of defendant's motion for a directed verdict.
In Bricks Unlimited, Inc. v. Lemoine Homes, Inc.,' the trial court
rendered judgment against the corporation and against the presi-
dent of the corporation. At one time the individual defendant had
made purchases from the plaintiff and had filed with plaintiff a
credit application on behalf of himself and not the corporation.
However, the transactions involved in this litigation involved sales
of bricks to the corporation and not to the individual who was the
president. Inasmuch as the president acted only in his corporate
capacity, the sales were made to the corporation, there was ade-
quate disclosure to the seller with reference to the identity of the
buyer, and the president did not assume any liability for the debts
of the corporation; the fourth circuit correctly reversed the judg-
ment of the trial court against the president of the corporation.
In Courtney Corporation v. Demarest,3 plaintiff corporation
owned immovable property located at 444 Broadway, New Orleans.
The former owner of 100% of the shares of the plaintiff corporation
sold all the shares to another. The former owner of the shares, in
another lawsuit, sought to rescind the sale. Pending trial of the
other lawsuit, the former owner recorded in the land records a
notice of the pendency of that action, describing it as one "to rescind
the sale of 444 Broadway." Plaintiff corporation filed suit to erase
the notice of lis pendens. The fourth circuit properly held that the
immovable was owned by plaintiff corporation and that the title
would be unaffected by the sale of the shares of stock or by a rescis-
sion of the sale. Property owned by a corporation is not owned by
the owner of 10 0% of the shares, and notice of lis pendens is inap-
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 380 So. 2d 646 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1979).
2. 380 So. 2d 714 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1980).
3. 379 So. 2d 812 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1980).
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propriate as against one not a party to nor affected by the pending
action.'
Plaintiff in Defelice v. Garon' owned one-half of the shares in
Pascal-Manale, Inc. As a part of the arrangements for financing the
purchase of the remaining one-half of the shares in the corporation,
defendants guaranteed a loan which plaintiff secured and also fur-
nished other security. In return, plaintiff as sole shareholder ex-
ecuted a contract denominated as a voting trust agreement, naming
defendants as trustees. The agreement provided that defendants
would manage the corporation for ten years, would hold the shares
in trust for ten years, and would have the unqualified right to vote
the shares as shareholders. The contract did not qualify as a voting
trust under the Business Corporation Law' because a voting trust
can be established only by two or more shareholders. The fourth cir-
cuit held that the contract, when viewed from the overall cir-
cumstances, was a security device. The same court had held
previously that section 75D of the Business Corporation Law per-
mits a pledgee to vote shares held in pledge only when the shares
are transferred into his name on the books of the corporation.7 The
court distinguished the instant case from Babst because here plain-
tiff expressly authorized defendants to vote the shares, whereas no
such authorization was given to the pledgee in Babst. The court
reasoned that if defendants were authorized to vote the shares, this
impliedly authorized them to transfer the shares on the books of the
corporation.
The Defelice decision is a reasonable and practical one, and the
interpretation of the statute by the court is consistent with the
statutory protections. The court failed to denominate the "security
device" as a pledge, but applied the statutory provisions relating to
pledge. Under different facts, the court would be free to treat other
"security devices" differently.
4. In dictum, the court said that the only appropriate remedy in such a case
would be use of the injunctive process. Id. at 813.
5. 380 So. 2d 676 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. granted, 383 So. 2d 21 (La. 1980).
6. LA. R.S. 12:78 (Supp. 1968).
7. Emile Babst Co. v. Commercial Enterprises, Inc., 274 So. 2d 742 (La. App. 4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 277 So. 2d 673 (La. 1973), noted 68 A.L.R.3d 674 (1976).
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